

FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD



PHILOSOPHY LECTURES PROSPECTUS

HILARY TERM 2017

The Philosophy Centre is found at the Radcliffe Humanities Building, on Woodstock Road, which is also the site of the Philosophy and Theology Faculties Library.

NOTES:

- “CL” means the lecture is a Core Lecture for one of the Honour Schools papers.
- The normal duration of an event is one hour. Where the class or lecture lasts longer than an hour, the start time and end time will be given.
- Unless otherwise specified, the lectures and classes are given for all of weeks 1 to 8.
- Lectures and classes begin at five minutes past the hour, and end five minutes before. (E.g: a lecture listed as “M. 10” will start on Mondays at 10.05am, and finish at 10.55am.)
- Students registered on Philosophy courses, and Faculty members, will need their University card to enter the Philosophy Centre at Radcliffe Humanities. Visitors should use the intercom on the front door to ask for access.
- There are several rooms used as lecture/class spaces at Radcliffe Humanities. The main rooms are: the Ryle Room (1st floor), the Lecture Room (2nd floor), and the Seminar Room (3rd floor). Other rooms sometimes used are the Colin Matthew Room (ground floor) and Meeting Room 4 (3rd floor).
- There is lift and stair access to all floors. A list of rooms is found by the stairwell and lift on each floor.
- “Schools” refers to the Examination Schools (75 – 81 High Street), one of the main lecturing facilities in the University. If you visit the Schools for a lecture or class, please be sure to check the electronic notice boards in the lobby, which will tell you which room the lecture/class is in.
- Every effort is made to ensure that the information contained in this Prospectus is accurate at the start of term, but sometimes errors persist. If you think you have found a mistake, please contact James Knight (james.knight@philosophy.ox.ac.uk).

Lectures for the First Public Examination

Students preparing for their First Public Examination (Prelims or Mods) should attend the following lectures this term:

PPE, Philosophy and Modern Languages, Philosophy and Theology, Psychology and Philosophy: Moral Philosophy, and General Philosophy

Mathematics and Philosophy, Physics and Philosophy, Computer Science and Philosophy: Elements of Deductive Logic, and General Philosophy; Turing on Computability and Intelligence (CSP only)

Literae Humaniores: any listed Prelims/Mods lecture that corresponds to their chosen Philosophy option for Mods

General Philosophy

Prof Ofra Magidor – W. 12, Schools

These lectures will cover the topics set out in the General Philosophy Syllabus: Knowledge and Scepticism, Induction, Mind and Body, Personal Identity, Free Will, and God and Evil.

Moral Philosophy: Mill, Utilitarianism

Prof William Mander – F. 12, Schools

Lecture 1	Introductory remarks
Lecture 2	Ethics of action vs ethics of character / Consequentialism vs deontology
Lecture 3	Subjective vs objective accounts of wellbeing / hedonism
Lecture 4	Higher & lower pleasures
Lecture 5	Objections to utilitarianism (i)
Lecture 6	Objections to utilitarianism (ii)
Lecture 7	Proof & sanctions
Lecture 8	Justice

Elements of Deductive Logic

Prof Alex Paseau – T. 12, Maths Institute (L2)

Elements of Deductive Logic builds on last term's Introduction to Logic lectures. It is aimed at students sitting Prelims in Mathematics & Philosophy, Physics & Philosophy, and Computer Science & Philosophy. The only set text is Halbach's *Logic Manual*, knowledge of which will be assumed. The course content is primarily metalogical and the focus will be heavily on truth-functional metalogic, with some discussion of quantified metalogic toward the end.

Turing on Computability and Intelligence

Prof Peter Millican – Th. 12, Hertford College (Ferrar Room)

These lectures, designed for the first year course in Computer Science and Philosophy, start with the background to Alan Turing's 1936 paper "On Computable Numbers", including Hilbert's programme, Gödel's incompleteness theorem, and Cantor's results concerning the countability of infinite sets. They then work in detail through the 1936 paper, using Charles Petzold's book *The Annotated Turing* (which contains the entire paper, together with comprehensive discussion) as a basis. Finally, the last few lectures will turn to Turing's 1950 paper "Computing Machinery and Intelligence", discussing some of the philosophical issues arising from the Turing Test and Searle's Chinese Room thought-experiment.

Lectures for the Honour Schools

Lectures listed in this section are **core lectures** for the papers in the Honour Schools: that is, these are lectures intended especially for students taking those papers at Finals. Questions set in Finals papers usually take the content of core lectures into account. It is therefore very much in your interest if you are a finalist to attend as many relevant core lectures as your schedule permits.

Students should also refer to the section *Other Lectures*, following. Lectures listed there are not official core lectures, but sometimes cover topics of relevance to the Finals papers.

101 Early Modern Philosophy: Hume

Prof Peter Kail – W. 10, Schools

These lectures are for paper 101, Early Modern Philosophy, and offer an overview of the set text, Book I Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature*. I shall follow the major contours of the Hume's masterpiece, introduce its main themes, discuss its coherence and Hume's overall aims. The topics covered include naturalism and scepticism, causal inference and the so-called problem of induction, causal powers and realism, the external world, the self and Hume's dissatisfaction with his account of it. For an introduction to the work, see Peter Kail "David Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature" in John Shand (ed.) *The Central Works of Philosophy* Vol. 2, Acumen Press (2005). Students should use either the Oxford Student edition (ed. Norton or Norton) or the older, but still acceptable, Selby-Bigge/Nidditch edition (again Oxford University Press).

101 Early Modern Philosophy: Leibniz

Prof Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra – Th. 11, Schools

These lectures will cover Leibniz's *Discourse on Metaphysics*, one of Leibniz's most fundamental works, and where he for the first time produces a philosophical system. In this work Leibniz discusses topics in Metaphysics, Epistemology, Philosophical Theology and Natural Philosophy, among others.

101 Early Modern Philosophy: Locke

Prof Anita Avramides – M. 10, Schools

These lectures are primarily intended for those studying for the Early Modern Philosophy paper (101). Others are most welcome to attend.

Lecture 1 & 2: A general introduction to the man and his works. Topics to be discussed: the relationship between philosophy and its history; the relationship between philosophy and science; Locke's attitude towards Aristotle, and to the Scholastics.

Lecture 3: Locke on knowledge and its limits

Lecture 4: Locke's reaction to innatism and his empiricist alternative.

Lecture 5 & 6: A general discussion of Locke on substance and real essence.

Lecture 7: Locke on abstract general ideas (and their importance)

Lecture 8: TBA

102 Knowledge and Reality: Metaphysics

Prof Ralf Bader – Th. 10, Schools

These lectures will focus on some of the core topics of metaphysics, in particular on causation, dispositions, persistence, composition, existence and induction.

103 Ethics: Normative Ethics

Prof Andreas Mogensen – T. 10, Schools

These lectures are intended primarily for students taking paper 103, Ethics, though anyone interested is welcome to attend. The lectures will address a number of key topics in ethical theory, including: consequentialist theories of right action; whether the ends always justify the means (looking at issues of doing vs allowing harm and intending vs foreseeing harm); the demandingness of morality; the value of equality; population ethics; and whether there exists a plausible non-consequentialist theory of right action (looking at Kantian contractualism and virtue ethics). These lectures will run in parallel with lectures on meta-ethics delivered by Dr Nye, which are also relevant for students taking paper 103.

103 Ethics: Meta-ethics

Dr Sebastian Nye – F. 10, Schools

These introductory lectures are intended for undergraduates taking the Ethics 103 paper. The course will explore some of the central metaethical questions, including: are there any moral facts and moral properties? If so, what are kind of facts and properties are they? Are moral judgements expressions of belief or something else? How can we justify moral claims (if at all)? What connection is there, if any, between moral judgements and motivation? The first lecture will offer an introduction to and overview of the web of issues metaethicists attempt to address. The remaining lectures will explore a range of metaethical theories, including: error theory; noncognitivism; relativism; moral naturalism and moral non-naturalism.

104 Philosophy of Mind II

Prof Ian Phillips – Th. 10, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room *except week 6*: Seminar Room)

These lectures are intended to complement those given by Dr Buehler in MT. They will consider debates and puzzles about the nature of a variety of different aspects of mind and their interrelations, including perception, memory, pain and bodily sensation, emotion, action and those states commonly classed as propositional attitudes: knowledge, belief, desire and intention. A helpful introductory text is Anthony Kenny's *The Metaphysics of Mind* (OUP, 1992) which follows the structure of Gilbert Ryle's classic *The Concept of Mind* (Hutchinson, 1949).

Provisional lecture plan:

1. Perception 1
2. Perception 2
3. Memory
4. Pain and Bodily Sensation
5. Emotion
6. The propositional attitudes 1
7. The propositional attitudes 2
8. Action

108 Philosophy of Logic and Language

Dr Jonny McIntosh – Th. 11, Schools

These lectures will offer an introduction to various topics in the philosophy of logic, taking Alfred Tarski's work on truth as a starting point. Subsequent lectures will introduce the following topics: logical consequence, logical constants, Kripke's theory of truth, the liar paradox, logical revision, logical pluralism, and the relationship between logic and reasoning. Note that these lectures are designed to complement Professor Paul Elbourne's lectures for this paper next term, which focus on topics in the philosophy of language.

110 Medieval Philosophy: Aquinas

Prof Cecilia Trifogli – W. 11, Schools

I will present the following topics from Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, qq. 2-11, 75-89; II.I, qq. 1-10, 90-97: (1) Existence of God (I, q. 2); (2) Nature of God (I, q. 3); (3) Soul (I, qq. 75-76); (4) Cognition (I, qq. 79, 84-86); (5) Will (I, qq. 80, 82-83; II.I, qq. 8-10); (6) Happiness (II.I, qq. 1-5); (7) Voluntary Actions (II.I, q. 6); (8) Eternal and Natural Law (II.I, qq. 90-97).

110 Medieval Philosophy: Duns Scotus, Ockham

Prof Cecilia Trifogli – T. 4 – 6 (*odd weeks*), Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Please see the entry for the [graduate class on Universals](#), below.

113 Post-Kantian Philosophy: Sartre, Merleau-Ponty

Dr Katherine Morris – F. 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were the two most prominent figures in French existential phenomenology. They were, moreover, friends and contemporaries, and each other's best critics. This lecture series critically explores major themes from their best-known works (Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* and Merleau-Ponty's *The Phenomenology of Perception*), indicating both commonalities and differences. Provisional programme:

Week I: Phenomenology and existential philosophy

Week II: Intentionality I: consciousness and the pre-reflective cogito

Week III: Bad faith

Week IV: Intellectual prejudices and the return to phenomena

Week V: The body I

Week VI: Intentionality II/The body II: operative intentionality

Week VII: Others, the look and intersubjectivity

Week VIII: Freedom

114 Theory of Politics

Department of Politics and International Relations – T. 12, Schools

Please consult the course page [here](#).

115 /130 Plato: *Republic*

Prof Dominic Scott – M. 10, Schools

The *Republic* is one of Plato's most famous and influential works. The dialogue is prompted by questions about the nature of justice and the best possible kind of life we can live. These questions lead to wide-ranging discussions of the ideal city, virtue and vice, the nature of knowledge and reality, the nature and immortality of the soul, moral psychology, education, and the arts. The study of the *Republic* will thus introduce you to many of Plato's central ideas and arguments.

These lectures are primarily intended for students taking papers 115/130 in any of the Honour Schools, but anyone with an interest in Plato and the history of philosophy is welcome to attend. (Knowledge of ancient Greek is not required.) Last term, Prof. Castagnoli gave eight lectures on books 1-5 of the *Republic*. This term Prof. Scott will do the same for the second half of the work, looking at a selection of key passages, topics and arguments in books 6-10. The aim will be to identify and discuss some of the main exegetical and philosophical questions that might be raised.

The following is a provisional guide to the topics to be covered in Hilary Term:

1. [a] Introduction to the second half of the *Republic*; [b] the defence of philosopher rulers in book VI
2. The images of the sun, line, and cave
3. Mathematics and dialectic in books VI-VII
4. The theory of education in books VI-VII
5. The account of degenerate constitutions in book VIII, including the critique of democracy
6. The analysis of tyranny in book IX and its importance to the *Republic* as a whole
7. The critique of the arts in book X
8. Overview of the defence of justice in the *Republic* as a whole

116 / 132 Aristotle: *Nicomachean Ethics*

Prof Karen Margrethe Nielsen – W. 10, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

The lectures are designed for undergraduates taking the *Nicomachean Ethics* paper in Greek or translation, but other interested parties are welcome to attend. It is suggested that attendees bring a copy of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. This term's lectures will focus on topics from *Nicomachean Ethics* Books 6-10. Topics from the first 5 books were covered in lectures in Michaelmas Term.

120 Intermediate Philosophy of Physics: Special Relativity

Prof Harvey Brown and Prof Oliver Pooley – M. T. 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

The course investigates the conceptual foundations of special relativity and various philosophical implications of the theory. It starts with an examination of the role of the relativity principle in Newtonian physics and its unexpected validity (absence of ether wind effects) in ether theories of electromagnetism. We will then see how Einstein, by using thermodynamics as a template, put different strands of 19th century physics together to create special relativity, and in the process illuminate the meaning of kinematics. New philosophical questions also arise, including: to what extent are space and time parts of a more fundamental unitary entity (spacetime); whether the geometry of space time explains the behaviour of matter or vice versa; and to what extent ideas such as the passage of time, and persistence through time have to be modified or abandoned in the context of relativistic physics.

The lectures are primarily aimed at second and third year undergraduates in the Physics and Philosophy course, and will from time to time presuppose the corresponding level of knowledge of physics, but they are open to anyone.

The anticipated schedule is as follows:

- Week 1 (HB) The relativity principle in Newtonian mechanics
- Week 2 (HB) Length contraction and time dilation in 19th century ether theories
- Week 3 (HB) Deriving the Lorentz (1905), Einstein (1905) and Poincaré (1911) transformations
- Week 4 (HB) Einstein's 1905 "principle theory" approach and his later misgivings
- Week 5 (OP) Special relativity as a theory of spacetime geometry
- Week 6 (OP) The conventionality of simultaneity; the geometrical perspective on length contraction and time dilation; the twins paradox
- Week 7 (OP) Geometrical versus dynamical explanation and spacetime ontology
- Week 8 (OP) Relativity and the metaphysics of time

121 Advanced Philosophy of Physics

Prof Oliver Pooley and Prof Adam Caulton – Th. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Please see the entry for the graduate class on [Philosophy of Physics](#), below.

124 Philosophy of Science (*continuation lectures from MT2016*)

Prof Adam Caulton – T. 10 (*weeks 1 to 3*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These lectures continue the core series from Michaelmas Term 2016.

125 Philosophy of Cognitive Science

Prof Martin Davies – T. 10 (*plus discussion 9.30 to 10*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These lectures are primarily intended for students taking Philosophy of Cognitive Science for examination in 2018, but may also provide useful revision for students taking the examination in 2017.

Lectures will last for one hour (10.00 – 11.00 am), with an additional half-hour (9.30 – 10.00 am) available for informal discussion of issues from the previous week's lecture or about the course generally.

Reading lists and PowerPoint presentations will be available on WebLearn.

The topics for this term's lectures will include:

- Levels of description and explanation (1): Personal and subpersonal levels
- The modularity of mind
- Everyday psychological understanding
- Delusions
- Cognitive neuropsychology and cognitive neuroscience
- Levels of description and explanation (2): Marr's three levels
- The language of thought and the computational theory of mind
- Connectionist models of cognitive processes

Several of the core readings for these lectures can be found in:

Bermúdez, J.L. (ed.) 2006: *Philosophy of Psychology: Contemporary Readings*. London: Routledge.

Background reading

Clark, A. 2014: *Mindware: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science* (Second Edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Crane, T. 2003: *The Mechanical Mind: A Philosophical Introduction to Minds, Machines and Mental Representations* (Second Edition; or Third Edition 2016). London: Routledge.

Davies, M. 2005: Cognitive science. In F. Jackson and M. Smith (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 358–94.

Stone, T. and Davies, M. 2012: Theoretical issues in cognitive psychology. In N. Braisby and A. Gellatly (eds), *Cognitive Psychology* (Second Edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 639–79.

127 Philosophical Logic

Prof James Studd – T. 12 (*all weeks*) and W. 12 (*weeks 1 and 2*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These are the core lectures for students taking FHS Paper 127. But they may also be of interest to others who want to learn about the technical details and philosophical applications of extensions to (and deviations from) classical logic.

There will also be two additional lectures in weeks 1 and 2. These deal with the mathematical methods used in the course, and are primarily aimed at students who did not take the second logic paper, Elements of Deductive Logic, for Prelims.

The paper is studied in conjunction with a set textbook, Theodore Sider's *Logic for Philosophy* (Oxford University Press). I recommend that you read the indicated sections of the book before attending the lecture each week.

The schedule for the main series of lectures is as follows:

Week 1. Classical propositional logic, variations, and deviations

LfP 2.1–2.4 (2.5 non-examinable), 3.1–3.4 (3.5 non-examinable)

Review of syntax and classical semantics for PL; three-valued semantics; supervaluationism

Week 2. Modal propositional logic: semantics

LfP 6.1–6.3, 7.1–7.3 (7.4 non-examinable)

Syntax of MPL; Kripke semantics for K, D, T, B, S4 and S5. Deontic, epistemic and tense logic.

Week 3. Modal propositional logic: proof theory

LfP 2.6, 2.8, 6.4

Axiomatic proofs for PL. Axiomatic proofs for K, D, T, B, S4 and S5.

Week 4. Modal propositional logic: metatheory

LfP 2.7, 6.5 (Proofs in 2.9, 6.6 non-examinable)

Soundness and Completeness for MPL. (Proof of completeness is non-examinable).

Week 5. Classical predicate logic, extensions, and deviations.

LfP 4, 5

Review of the syntax and classical semantics of PC. Extensions of PC. Free logic.

Week 6. Quantified modal logic: constant domains

LfP 9.1–9.5, 9.7

Semantics and proof theory for SQML.

Week 7. Quantified modal logic: variable domains, 2D semantics

LfP 9.6, 10

Kripke semantics for variable domain K, D, T, B, S4, and S5. Two-dimensional semantics for @, X and F.

Week 8. Counterfactuals.

LfP 8

Stalnaker's and Lewis's semantics for counterfactuals.

Lecture notes and problem sheets will be posted on the course webpage:

www.jamesstudd.net/127

180 The Rise of Modern Logic

Prof Volker Halbach – T. 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Meeting Room 4)

Intended audience: For candidates in Mathematics and Philosophy Part C, Physics and Philosophy Part C, and the B.Phil. in Philosophy offering this subject for examination. Anyone else is welcome to attend.

In the lectures I will survey the development of logic from Frege's *Begriffsschrift* 1879 to Gödel's incompleteness theorems in 1931. This was the period that shaped modern logic, but also many discussions in philosophy of mathematics, logic, and language. Topics that are still debated today such as the significance of second-order logic, the role of set theory as a foundations of mathematics, and incompleteness phenomena emerged during this period for the first time. Studying the roots of these discussions can help to clarify the contemporary debates.

For a survey see Paolo Mancosu, Richard Zach, and Calixto Badea, *The Development of Mathematical Logic from Russell to Tarski: 1900-1935*, to appear in Leila Haaparanta, ed., *The History of Modern Logic*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, available online at <http://www.ucalgary.ca/rzach/papers/history.html>.

For further readings and a plan of the lectures see <http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop0114/lehre/rise17.html>

Introduction to the Philosophy of Science

Dr Sophie Allen – M. 12, Schools

This course introduces you to some general topics in the philosophy of science. What is science and can we distinguish science from other forms of enquiry? What are scientific theories about? Do scientists discover what there is in the world, or are scientific theories tools with which we predict and explain? Is there a scientific method, and what does it involve? How are scientific theories, models or hypotheses confirmed or rejected? What is the relationship between evidence and theory? Does science make progress? And if so, how does it progress? Is scientific enquiry free from social and cultural influences?

These lectures will not presuppose any prior study of philosophy. They support the options of *History and Philosophy of Science*, available in some Honour Schools in the natural sciences subjects, and the supplementary subject *Philosophy of Science* in the Honour School of Physics. Students considering taking these options are encouraged to come along.

Students should initially approach philosophy tutors in their own colleges in order to arrange tutorial teaching for this course (or ask their own subject tutors to do this for them), although there may also be the possibility of arranging some tutorial teaching at the lectures.

Interested students are referred to past papers on OXAM for some idea of what is covered (search on paper code, using the search term “4683”).

Other Lectures (suitable for all audiences)

Buddhist Philosophy

Dr Rafal Stepień – F. 2 (*except week 2: F. 10*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This series of lectures constitutes a thematic introduction to Buddhist philosophy. It explores major topics in Buddhist ontology, epistemology, philosophy of logic and language, philosophy of mind, ethics, and other fields. While arranged thematically, the course also serves as an introduction to the history of Buddhist philosophy, in that each lecture singles out certain prominent thinkers or movements to illustrate the problematic at hand. This approach allows classical Buddhist philosophers to be studied who represent all the major schools of Buddhist thought from India, Tibet, China, and Japan. In addition to reading relevant primary sources in translation, students are encouraged to read secondary scholarship selected so as to help guide them through the seriously mind-altering ideas encountered in the Buddhist philosophical world. The course also proposes ways in which Buddhist thought can contribute to Western philosophical issues and, conversely, how intellectual paradigms prevalent in the West can be used to understand Buddhist philosophy. Students interested in broadening their mind beyond the confines of Western philosophy should find this course rewarding.

The likely order of topics is as follows:

Lecture 1: Buddhism as Philosophy

Surveys the history of Buddhist philosophy, introduces the core philosophical tenets shared across traditions, and provides a rationale for studying Buddhist philosophy as philosophy.

Lecture 2: Causation, Interdependence, and Impermanence

Addresses the metaphysical underpinnings of the Buddhist worldview.

Lecture 3: Ontology

Explores Buddhist anti-foundationalist ontologies of emptiness.

Lecture 4: Selfhood & Personhood

Draws on the Buddha's arguments for the ultimate non-existence of a substantial self to explicate the conventional operation of personal action.

Lecture 5: Epistemology

Addresses the nature of knowledge and examines the validity of perception and inference as means of its acquisition.

Lecture 6: Philosophy of Mind

Addresses cognition and self-cognition in the light of idealist and phenomenological accounts of mind.

Lecture 7: Philosophy of Logic & Language

Focuses on Buddhist formulations of non-classical logics and the linguistic expression of concepts.

Lecture 8: Ethics

Addresses normative ethics and their application to contemporary social issues.

Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems

Dr Dan Isaacson – M. W. 11, Mathematical Institute (L3)

Prerequisites:

This course presupposes knowledge of first-order predicate logic up to and including soundness and completeness theorems for a formal system of first-order predicate logic (as is covered in B1 Logic).

Course Overview:

The starting point is Gödel's mathematical sharpening of Hilbert's insight that manipulating symbols and expressions of a formal language has the same formal character as arithmetical operations on natural numbers. This allows the construction for any consistent formal system containing basic arithmetic of a 'diagonal' sentence in the language of that system which is true but not provable in the system. By further study we are able to establish the intrinsic meaning of such a sentence. These techniques lead to a mathematical theory of formal provability which generalizes the earlier results. We end with results that further sharpen understanding of formal provability.

Course Synopsis:

Gödel numbering of a formal language; the diagonal lemma. Expressibility of sets and relations in a formal language. The arithmetical undefinability of truth in arithmetic. Formal systems of arithmetic; arithmetical proof predicates. Σ_0 -completeness and Σ_1 -completeness. The arithmetical hierarchy; ω -consistency and 1-consistency; the first Gödel incompleteness theorem. Separability; the Rosser incompleteness theorem. Adequacy conditions for a provability predicate; the second Gödel incompleteness theorem; Löb's theorem. Provable Σ_1 -completeness. The ω -rule. Provability logic GL; fixed point theorems for GL. The Bernays arithmetized completeness theorem; undecidable Δ_2 -sentences of arithmetic.

Reading List:

Lecture notes for the course.

Further Reading:

1. Raymond M. Smullyan, *Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems* (Oxford University Press, 1992).
2. George S. Boolos and Richard C. Jeffrey, *Computability and Logic* (3rd edition, Cambridge University Press, 1989), Chs 15, 16, 27 (pp 170-190, 268-284).
3. George Boolos, *The Logic of Provability* (Cambridge University Press, 1993).

Degrees of Belief

Dr Teru Thomas – Th. 12 (*weeks 1 to 4*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

I am about to flip a coin. I don't believe that the coin will land heads, nor do I believe that it won't. I certainly don't *know* either way. But my attitude towards the coin flip goes beyond mere agnosticism. For example, I am agnostic about the coin flip and I am agnostic about the weather, but I am *more confident* that the coin will land heads than I am that it will rain tomorrow.

Bayesian epistemology puts such levels of confidence, or 'degrees of belief', at centre stage. What norms govern degrees of belief? How should they change in light of new evidence? And how should they affect what we do? Such questions have been important in many different areas of contemporary philosophy. These four introductory lectures, open to all, may be of particular interest to some undergraduates studying Knowledge and Reality, Ethics, Philosophy of Science, and Intermediate Philosophy of Physics.

Here is the expected schedule.

1. Partial Belief and Full Belief

This lecture will provide a general introduction to the Bayesian point of view, including (a) arguments that degrees of belief are like probabilities; (b) a discussion of the relationship between degrees of belief and ordinary full belief.

2. Decision Theory

Degrees of belief play a natural role in theories of rational action and decision-making. I will examine how they do so, focusing in particular on two important topics in normative ethics: subjective consequentialism and moral uncertainty.

3. Learning and Confirmation

This lecture will examine how one's degrees of belief should change when one's evidence changes. It will include a discussion of Bayesian confirmation theory.

4. Priors and Objective Chance

One key issue arising in the preceding discussions is what your *priors* ought to be – roughly, what you ought to believe before you have any evidence. My discussion of this issue will include, in particular, an examination of the relationship between degrees of belief and objective chance.

I will suggest some readings; a useful collection is Eagle (2011), *Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings*.

Aquinas: Ethics and Theory of Action

Dr Joseph Shaw – W. 12, Schools

1. Introduction to Thomist Philosophy of Action: sources and method

Looking at the impact of Aristotle on the medieval debate, Aquinas's role in the reception of Aristotle, and Aquinas's philosophical method.

2. Natural and Supernatural Happiness (Ia IIae qq. 1-5)

Aristotle's treatment of happiness is adopted by Aquinas but only as an account of Natural Happiness. Aquinas's account of Supernatural Happiness is in terms of the Beatific Vision of God accessible to the Saints in Heaven.

3. Voluntary Action (Ia IIae q. 6)

Aristotle's distinction between voluntary, involuntary and non-voluntary actions is key to his account of praise and blame. Aquinas adopts Aristotle's distinctions.

4. The Will and its Freedom (Ia IIae qq. 8-10)

The notion of the Will is not Aristotelian, but comes to Aquinas from the Augustinian tradition. The relationship between free will and natural and supernatural causation is important but complex.

5. Weakness of the Will (Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics Bk7; Commentary on St Paul's Letter to the Romans Ch7)

This presents a problem for all 'eudaimonist' theories of human motivation: what motivates an agent to do what the agent knows is wrong? Aristotle's discussion is one source for Aquinas; the theory of the will is a complicating factor. The best discussions in Aquinas are outside the set text.

6. Introduction the Thomist Moral Philosophy: sources and method

The notion of Natural Law comes to Aquinas from Augustine; it was first developed by the Stoics. The relationship between a 'law' conception of ethics and a 'virtue' conception, as found in Aristotle, is central to understanding Aquinas. Further distinctions in the 'law' approach were made by the canonists in the century or so before Aquinas.

7. Eternal and Natural Law (qq. 90-94)

God's plan for the Universe is his Eternal Law; the moral law governing human action derives from this. Aquinas's famous discussion of the Natural Law is seminal for the later tradition, and is the working out of his synthesis of the Aristotelian and Augustinian traditions.

8. Human Law and the State (qq. 95-97)

The Natural Law makes possible and perhaps necessary community life and the state, but it does not set the state up or determine exactly what form it should take.

The interaction between the morally necessary and the historically fortuitous is worked out in Aquinas's discussion.

Wittgenstein's Private Language Arguments

Dr Peter Hacker – T. 2.30 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This series of lectures is intended for undergraduates taking FHS Paper 118, The Philosophy of the Later Wittgenstein, and anyone interested in Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology. They presuppose little knowledge of Wittgenstein, but those attending should read *Philosophical Investigations* §§243-315.

Each lecture is self-contained and consists of a combination of lecture and dialogue. Each lecture will take between 50 minutes to an hour or so to deliver, followed by a further half an hour of questions and discussion.

The topics for the eight lectures/dialogues are as follows:

1. The private language *arguments*
2. Private ownership of experience: "You can't have my pains and I can't have your sympathy"
3. Epistemic privacy of experience: "Only I really know that I have a pain, you just believe I do"
4. Private ostensive definition
5. My mind and other minds
6. The inner and the outer
7. The mereological fallacy and cognitive neuroscience
8. Thought and language

Graduate Classes

Graduate classes are, except where otherwise indicated, intended for the Faculty's BPhil and MSt students. Other students may attend, and are welcome, provided they first seek and obtain the permission of the class-giver(s).

With the more popular graduate classes, attendance by those outside of the BPhil and MSt can cause the teaching rooms to become overcrowded. In such circumstances, BPhil and MSt students, for whom these classes are intended, must take priority. Those not on the BPhil or MSt will be expected, if asked by the class-giver(s), to leave the class for the benefit of the intended audience.

Aristotelian Hylomorphism

Prof Lindsay Judson and Prof Michail Peramatzis – W. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Topics/Texts

Wk 1: Matter and form in *Physics* I (LJ)

Wk 2: *Physics* II.1: Nature; Matter & Form as Natures (LJ)

Wk 3: *Physics* II.2 (& *Metaphysics* Z.11): Mathematical vs Natural Form I: Errors of 'Hyperformalism' & Snubness Introduced (MP)

Wk 4: *De Anima* I.1: Mathematical vs Natural Form II: Enmattered Formulae (MP)

Wk 5: *Metaphysics* E.1: Mathematical vs Natural Form III: Snubness & Soul (MP)

Wk 6: *Metaphysics* Z.10-11: 'one thing in another or certain things in a certain state'; *Sophistici Elenchi* 13 & 31 (& *Metaphysics* Z.5): Snubness, Babbling, and Resolution (MP)

Wk 7: *Physics* II.3 & 7-9 (selections) & *Metaphysics* Z.17 and H: Matter, Form, & Causes; Essence, Form, & Final Cause; Hypothetical Necessity & 'Matter in the Formula' (LJ)

Wk 8: *De Partibus Animalium* I.1 & *Meteorologica* IV.12: Hylomorphism, Teleology, & Hypothetical Necessity in Natural Science (LJ)

Further materials are available on weblearn.

Freedom, Determinism, and Responsibility in Ancient Philosophy

Prof Luca Castagnoli, Prof Ursula Coope, and Prof Terence Irwin – T. 2 – 4, Oriel College (Harris Seminar Room)

This seminar will be suitable for Ancient MSt students; BPhil students (including 1st year BPhil students), and other more advanced students.

During the two terms shall discuss a range of authors from Plato to Aquinas, focussing on two related topics: (i) Voluntariness; being up to us. (Questions such as: why did certain philosophers think that no one does wrong voluntarily and what does this imply about moral responsibility? what, if anything is the relation between acting voluntarily and having the ability to act otherwise? what is the relation between voluntariness, being 'up to us' and the ability to give rational assent?) (ii) Freedom. (Questions such as: how did freedom come to be associated with a kind of perfection? Why did the Stoics think that only the sage is free? Why does Alexander associate freedom so closely with the notion of being up to us? Why do the Neoplatonists think something must be immaterial to be free?)

The provisional schedule for HT is:

- 1) Introduction: freedom, responsibility and fate, some questions. Freedom: in Plato.
- 2) Plato: the view that no one voluntarily does wrong, and questions about the relation of this to responsibility
- 3) Aristotle on the voluntary 1
- 4) Aristotle on the voluntary 2
- 5) The Epicureans on Determinism, reason, and what depends on us.
- 6) The Stoics: fate, assent, responsibility
- 7) The Stoics: the freedom of the sage.
- 8) Responses to logical determinism: The sea battle and the master argument

Universals

Prof Cecilia Trifogli – T. 4 – 6, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

I will present and discuss two major views in the medieval debate about the ontological status of universals: that of John Duns Scotus and that of William of Ockham. I will cover the following topics:

- (1) Scotus on the existence and ontological status of common natures.
- (2) Scotus's theory of individuation ('haecceity').
- (3) Ockham's arguments against realism about universals.
- (4) Ockham's positive account of universals ('conceptualism').

The texts of Scotus and Ockham are available in English translation in: *Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals*, transl. Paul Vincent Spade, Hackett, Indianapolis 1994, pp. 57-113 (Scotus), 114-231 (Ockham).

Introductory reading: M. McCord Adams, 'Universals in the early fourteenth century' in: *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg, CUP 1982, pp. 411-439.

Descartes: *Meditations, Objections and Replies*

Prof Paul Lodge – Th. 11 – 1, Mansfield College (Seminar Room East)

There will be a Weblearn page for this class. Please consult it before the first meeting for a more detailed syllabus and preparatory reading for Week 1.

Those interested in doing some reading over the vacation should look at the main text for the course, which is available online via SOLO is volume two of *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, in two volumes (ed.) and (trans.) by Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch (Cambridge, 1984-85). I also recommend Hatfield's *Routledge Guidebook to Descartes and the Meditations* as a good and readable secondary text for (re)orientation toward the *Meditations* as a whole.

The aim of this seminar is quite simple – to engage in a close reading of Descartes' *Meditations on First Philosophy* along with some of the most important of the *Objections and Replies* that were published along with the *Meditations* in 1641.

In focussing on the primary texts rather than disputes in the secondary literature, part of the aim will be engage with Descartes' ideas in such a way that we try to imagine what it would be like to see the world with 'Cartesian glasses'. The Descartes that will emerge will probably seem somewhat more alien than he appears during most undergraduate encounters. But it is hoped that those attending the seminar may discover things of unexpected philosophical interest in virtue of this.

After an introductory week, we will cover each Meditation in turn in weeks 2-7 along with some of the more interesting objections. In Week 8, we will consider some important contemporary responses to issues that emerge in the *Meditations* that are not included in the *Objections and Replies*, including objections from Elisabeth of Bohemia and Leibniz.

I will structure the seminars around a presentation based on the readings for the week of my own followed by discussion of questions pertaining to the readings that participants have sent me prior to the seminar as well as any additional questions that might arise.

I will, of course, be happy to give advice on secondary literature should students find topics that they would like to pursue further in association with BPhil assessment.

Philosophy of Physics

Prof Adam Caulton and Prof Oliver Pooley – Th. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This series of classes will cover contemporary topics in the philosophy of physics, with emphasis on spacetime and quantum theories, and on the significance of symmetries for the interpretation of those theories. The primary intended audience is MSt students in Philosophy of Physics and fourth year Physics & Philosophy undergraduates studying the Advanced Philosophy of Physics paper. Others (especially BPhil students with a Philosophy of Physics interest) are welcome. The provisional schedule is:

Weeks 1-4: Dr. Oliver Pooley

Week 1. The “hole” argument in general relativity

Week 2. Symmetry and Newtonian spacetime structure

Week 3. Barbour’s programme

Week 4. Constrained Hamiltonian systems and the problem of time

Weeks 5-8: Dr. Adam Caulton

Week 5. Symmetries and representation

Week 6. The identity of indiscernibles in quantum mechanics

Week 7. Gibbs’ paradox & the explanation for quantum statistics

Week 8. Field and particle in QFT

We will be working through 1-2 relevant papers in each class, and it’s an expectation of attendance (at least for MSt/APP students) that you are willing to present the contents of one of the papers in a class at some point. Advance offers welcome (email oliver.pooley@philosophy.ox.ac.uk or adam.caulton@philosophy.ox.ac.uk).

Philosophy of Science

Dr Christopher Timpson and Prof Alex Kaiserman – T. 2 – 4, Brasenose College (Lecture Room 7)

This class is intended for those offering Philosophy of Science in the BPhil, for Philosophy of Physics MSt students, and for anyone else who might be interested. Some degree of background in philosophy of science will be assumed, such as might be acquired by having attended the core lectures for FHS in philosophy of science, given in Michaelmas term. In this class we will look at a range of topics in the philosophy of science in some greater depth. Topics to be covered are expected to include: local vs global arguments regarding scientific realism, Bayesian confirmation theory and the question of non-empirical support for theories (with a specific focus on recent arguments regarding the scientific status – or otherwise – of string theory in physics), and the relationship between physics and the special sciences.

Each week, a target piece of reading will be specified, which everyone attending the class will be expected to have read and to have thought about. (See Weblearn for details of the proposed target readings, and for some background and further readings.) Classes will begin with a brief introduction to, or summary of, the target piece (or pieces), as a jumping-off point for discussion. At the first-week class, volunteers will be sought to provide these brief introductions in subsequent weeks.

Philosophy of Mind

Prof Bill Child and Prof Anil Gomes – F. 11 – 1, University College

There will be a Weblearn Site for this class. Please consult it before the first class.

The class will cover contemporary topics in the philosophy of mind, with an emphasis on recent papers covering a range of issues in the metaphysics and epistemology of mind. It is intended primarily for BPhil students.

If you are interested in attending the class, please let us know, by e-mailing bill.child@univ.ox.ac.uk.

- 1st and 2nd year BPhil students are entitled to attend. But please let us know that you are planning to come, to give us an idea of numbers.
- Other students may be permitted to attend, depending on numbers. Please let us know that you are interested in attending. We will be in touch before the first class to let you know whether there is space for you to join the class.

The primary readings will be as follows. (The order in which they are listed here isn't the order in which they will be studied in the class. The detailed syllabus will be posted on Weblearn in due course.)

1. Camp, Elisabeth (2009). 'Putting thoughts to work: Concepts, systematicity, and stimulus-independence'. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 78 (2):275-311.
2. Campbell, John (2011) 'Intelligible Causation'. In Jason Bridges, Niko Kolodny, and Wai-Hung Wong (eds.), *The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Essays for Barry Stroud* (OUP)
3. Farkas, Katalin (2003). 'What is externalism?' *Philosophical Studies* 112 (3):187-208.
4. Friedman, Jane (2013). 'Suspended judgment' *Philosophical Studies* 162 (2):165-181.
5. Gendler, Tamar Szabó (2008). 'Alief and Belief'. *Journal of Philosophy* 105 (10):634-663.
6. McGeer, Victoria (2015). 'Mind-making practices: the social infrastructure of self-knowing, agency and responsibility'. *Philosophical Explorations*, 18 (2):259-281.
7. Phillips, Ian (2013). 'Afterimages and Sensation'. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 87 (2):417-453.
8. Wright, Crispin (2015). 'Self-knowledge: the reality of privileged access'. In S. Goldberg ed. *Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism* (CUP)

Please let us know if you are particularly interested in presenting any of these papers to the class.

The class will be held in University College. The provisional location is a first-floor room which is accessed by a spiral staircase. But please let us know if that might make access difficult for you.

Topics in the Philosophy of Perception

Dr Denis Buehler – W. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Topics for this class include the nature of attention, attentional effects on vision and experience, and individual-level unconscious perception. Participants should be prepared to engage with relevant empirical literature.

For the seminar's first meeting please read chapters 1-3 of Wu, W. 2014, *Attention*, Routledge, and Carrasco, M. 2011, "Visual Attention - The last 25 Years," *Vision Research*.

Topics in Frege's Philosophy of Mathematics

Prof Ian Rumfitt – W. 2 – 4, All Souls College (Hovenden Room)

This seminar is intended for graduate students, although interested undergraduates are also welcome. I aim to cover central topics from Frege's two books on the philosophy of mathematics, *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik* and *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*. For *Die Grundlagen*, I recommend the translation by J.L. Austin (3rd edition, Blackwell). The only complete translation of *Grundgesetze* is the recent OUP version by Philip Ebert and Marcus Rossberg.

The tentative schedule is as follows. I say 'tentative' because if those attending the seminar are keen that we should discuss some topic not on the list below, I am in principle willing to adjust to accommodate that preference. The recommended readings below are simply the most pertinent passages from the primary texts. I shall suggest appropriate secondary literature we go on.

Week One (18 January 2017)

An overview of Frege's project in the philosophy of mathematics

No particular reading, although anything from *Die Grundlagen* or *Grundgesetze* would help.

Week Two (25 January)

To which concepts do numbers attach?

Reading: *Die Grundlagen* §§45-52

Week Three (1 February)

Cardinals versus ordinals

Reading: *Die Grundlagen* §§84-86

Week Four (8 February)
Impredicative versus predicative second-order logic
No primary readings

Week Five (15 February)
The logical system of *Grundgesetze*
Reading: *Grundgesetze* I §§1-25

Week Six (22 February)
The attempt to establish consistency
Reading: *Grundgesetze* I §§26-32

Week Seven (1 March)
Frege's later theory of definitions
Reading: *Grundgesetze* II §§55-67, §§139-47

Week Eight (8 March)
Frege's theory of real numbers
Reading: *Grundgesetze* II §§156-172

Formal Semantics

Prof Paul Elbourne – W. 9 – 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Much work by contemporary philosophers of language applies the tools of formal semantics to problems long deemed philosophical. This course trains students in the craft of doing formal semantics. It introduces Frege's hypothesis that functional application is the mechanism by which the meaning of a complex phrase is composed from the meanings of its constituent parts. It applies this method to the analysis of a variety of core semantic phenomena, including argument structure, adjectival modification, definite descriptions, relative clauses, binding, and quantification. Emphasis throughout is on training students to be able to produce explicit detailed analyses of novel data.

We will be using the following textbook: Irene Heim and Angelika Kratzer, *Semantics in Generative Grammar*, Blackwell 1998.

Before the first session, participants are requested to read the first three chapters of the textbook and do some exercises from them. They should concentrate particularly on Exercise 3 on pages 32-3; they will find it convenient to use the lambda notation as defined on pages 34-9.

Logical Consequence

Prof Alex Paseau and Dr Owen Griffiths – W. 4 – 6, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

These classes will investigate the central concept in the philosophy of logic: logical consequence. We will also consider the closely related concepts of logical form, formalisation and the logical constants. We will consider these concepts from philosophical, technical and historical perspectives. The plan is as follows.

Week 1: The intuitive conception of logical consequence; Logical Monism.

Week 2: Logic as formal; the model-theoretic conception of logical consequence.

Week 3: The logic of logical truth and other technical results.

Week 4: John Etchemendy on logical consequence.

Week 5: The relation between formal and informal concepts; squeezing arguments.

Week 6: The project of formalisation.

Week 7: Invariance approaches to the logical constants.

Week 8: Inferentialist approaches to the logical constants.

Aesthetics

Prof Alison Hills – T. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This seminar will cover a series of related issues in aesthetics, with a particular focus on aesthetic value. In the background will be a comparison between aesthetics and ethics. Particular topics will include:

1. Aesthetic experience
2. Aesthetic emotion
3. Creativity
4. Experientialism
5. Artistic value and aesthetic value
6. Aesthetic and moral evaluation
7. Realism, objectivity and disagreement
8. Aesthetic testimony.

Foundations of Effective Altruism

Prof Frank Arntzenius and Prof Hilary Greaves – M. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Effective Altruism (EA) is a growing social movement, characterised by a combination of compassion and hard-headed rationality. 'Effective altruists' take seriously their responsibility, or anyway their opportunity, to make the world a better place (compassion); but they also take very seriously the need to *use the most effective means* for making the world a better place, so that the amount of good done for a fixed amount of effort is maximised (rationality). This, of course, raises numerous questions in moral philosophy:

about, for instance, what counts as ‘doing the most good’, the nature of our responsibility to take steps in this direction, and the extent of our ability to do so.

In the past couple of years, some very good books have been published for a popular audience, setting out the basic tenets of effective altruism, and how those who are interested in taking on its approach might use these guiding ideas to influence their actions in practice, in terms of monetary donations and/or career or volunteering choices. Instead of (re-)covering these basic tenets, this seminar series will focus on the more philosophical issues that those basic tenets highlight and draw on.

The intellectual origins of the EA movement can be traced, historically, to Peter Singer’s 1971 article “Famine, affluence and morality”, which famously argued that ordinary citizens in the affluent West have very weighty obligations to the global poor. We will start here, discussing Singer’s argument together with responses by various others. Subsequent topics will include: the abilities of individuals to ‘make a difference’, career choice, the moral relevance (if any) of the distinction between identified and statistical lives, the notion of conditional obligation, existential risk, and cluelessness.

Seminar discussions will be based in part in pre-read articles. For each meeting, we will designate ‘core’ readings that we expect all seminar participants to have read, together with optional further readings: The core readings for the first meeting are as follows (both on Weblearn):

- Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence and morality’
- McMahan, ‘Philosophical critiques of effective altruism’

Optional further readings for Week 1 are:

- MacAskill, ‘Doing Good Better’ (This is highly recommended for those who are not already familiar with the basic ideas of the EA movement. NB this is a whole book, but is non-academic and very readable.)
- Unger, ‘Living high and letting die’, chapter 2
- Reviews of MacAskill’s and Singer’s books by philosophers (follow up the references in McMahan’s article)

Watch Singer’s TED talk:

https://www.ted.com/talks/peter_singer_the_why_and_how_of_effective_altruism?language=en

Perfect Being Theism

Prof Brian Leftow – Th. 3 – 5, Oriel College (MacGregor Room)

Perfect being theology develops a concept of God by thinking about what a perfect being would be like. Perfect being theism is a set of claims about God which most perfect being thinkers came to endorse: that God is simple, immutable, atemporal and necessarily existent. This class will introduce, explicate and evaluate these claims. The main focus will be analytical, critical and constructive, but there will be considerable discussion of historical figures including Plotinus, Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas. Audience: students of philosophy of religion, classical philosophy and medieval philosophy.

Regular Faculty Seminars

The programmes of the Faculty seminars are no longer included in this Lecture Prospectus, since running lists are often not settled by the time this Prospectus is published. Instead, students and Faculty members are referred to the weekly events digest, sent from the Faculty in each week of term, which includes details of each of the seminars (often with a linked abstract). Interested parties may also refer to seminars' individual webpages, where one exists.

The Faculty seminars listed here all take place in some weeks of each term of the year, at Radcliffe Humanities (either in the Ryle Room or the Lecture Room) unless otherwise indicated. The usual schedule is given as a guide, but should be checked in any term against that term's Lecture List, or the digest for the week.

- Monday* **Moral Philosophy Seminar**
Usual schedule: weekly, 4.30 to 6.30, Lecture Room
Webpage: http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/lectures/moral_philosophy
- Philosophy of Mathematics Seminar**
Usual schedule: weeks vary; 4.30 to 6.30, Ryle Room
Webpage: <http://users.ox.ac.uk/~philmath/pomseminar.html>
- Tuesdays* **Post-Kantian European Philosophy Seminar**
Usual schedule: even-numbered weeks, 5 to 7, Ryle Room
Webpage: http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/lectures/the_postkantian_seminar
- Aesthetics Seminar (Hilary Term only)**
Schedule in HT2017: odd-numbered weeks, 4 to 6, Exeter College (Quarrell Room)
plus an additional session on Monday of week 8, 4 to 6
No webpage live at time of writing: see events digest, or contact conveners ([James Grant](#), [Yuuki Ohta](#)) for information
- Thursdays* **Workshop in Ancient Philosophy**
Usual schedule: weekly, 4.30 to 6, Ryle Room
Webpage:
http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/lectures/workshop_in_ancient_philosophy
- Philosophy of Physics Seminar**
Usual schedule: weekly, 4.30 to 6.30, Lecture Room
Webpage: <http://www.philosophy-of-physics.ox.ac.uk/tag/thursday-seminars/>
- Fridays* **Jowett Society / Philosophical Society**
Usual schedule: weekly, 3.30 to 5.30, Lecture Room
Webpage: <https://jowettsociety.wordpress.com/>

In addition to these, there are usually "work in progress" groups, or WIPs: most commonly, the Theoretical Philosophy WIP (<http://users.ox.ac.uk/~twip/>), and in some terms a Mind WIP meets.